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There is a major split between developed and developing countries over the protection 
of the patents in pharmaceuticals in the TRIPS. This dispute is symptomatic of the 
difficulties of incorporating a non-trade issue into a trade organization. Incentives and 
threats are examined in the context of the TRIPS. It is concluded that developing 
countries have no direct incentives to protect intellectual property, that the threat of 
trade actions is unlikely to induce compliance and that the use of indirect incentives is 
discredited and will fail to achieve its objective over the long run. Successful 
protection of intellectual property in developing countries will require a way to provide 
them with a direct incentive to enforce such protection. 
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I see lots of hard work remains to be done in TRIPS, especially to bring 
Members’ distant positions closer. 
WTO Director General Supachai Panitchpakdi
1 
… we are encouraging manufacturers able to make available medicines at 
lower prices for developing countries to do so. Here again, we have 
suggested to offer a new legal tool at the EU level to ensure that the 
medicines exported under it do reach the countries for which they are 
intended and are not exported back to the EU. But let’s not forget the 
people who can’t afford medicines, however cheap they are. They too are 
entitled to treatment. Medicines are not a luxury. Let’s join forces in a 
coalition of the willing to make sure that those who need them get them. 
      EU  Trade  Commissioner  Pascal  Lamy
2 
We support treating pharmaceutical patent rights in a flexible fashion to 
help poor countries facing severe public health crises. However, we also 
believe that it is unwise for the on going negotiations in Geneva to move in 
a direction that threatens to erode the central protections of the TRIPS 
provisions as related to pharmaceutical patents throughout the developing 
world. 
United States Senators Charles E. Grassley and Jeff Bingaman
3  
Sadly, while HIV/AIDS has taken its greatest toll in sub-Saharan Africa, 
most of the region’s representatives to Geneva are not attending meetings 
related to this issue or engaging in the debate. 




ad the anti-globalization forces been given free rein to devise an issue with 
which to discredit the international trading system, they could not have invented 
a better one than the current debate over the protection of pharmaceuticals in 
developing countries. It pits large transnational pharmaceutical companies backed by 
governments in the United States, the European Union and other major developed 
countries against impoverished populations devastated by epidemics of medieval 
proportions concentrated in some of the world’s poorest and most dysfunctional 
countries. While it was readily agreed by developed-country governments at the Doha 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Ministerial Meeting in 2001 that a relaxation of the 
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strict Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) protocols 
should be allowed in public health emergencies, the devil is in the details and the 
means to implement the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS and Public Health have 
proved elusive (WTO, 2002). 
The conflict over pharmaceuticals, however, is symptomatic of the tension over 
the TRIPS that permeates relations among developed and developing countries and 
spills over into other aspects of their relations at the WTO. There are other significant 
issues that the Council for TRIPS is attempting to deal with, which are tangential to 
international trade, but exacerbate tensions between developing countries and 
developed countries. These include: the patenting of living organisms, which directly 
involves the TRIPS in the controversy over biotechnology (Kerr and Yampoin, 2000; 
Gaisford et al., 2001); the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore (Gaisford 
and Kerr, 2002; Isaac and Kerr, 2002); the expansion of provisions for geographic 
indicators
5; issues relating to intellectual property in electronic commerce; and 
assistance in developing the capacity to create intellectual property in developing 
countries. None of these issues has an obvious solution given the high potential stakes 
for developed countries, the small benefits likely to accrue to developing countries 
and their limited enforcement capacity. 
Inherent Contradictions 
  K
nowledge has characteristics attributable to public goods. Knowledge is non-
rivalrous in use and non-excludable. The former means that the use of 
knowledge by one individual does not preclude its use by others. The latter means that 
once knowledge is in the public domain, it is almost impossible to privately prevent 
others from acquiring and using it. As a result, it is virtually impossible for the creator 
of knowledge to appropriate any benefits arising from its existence. In many cases 
goods and services with these characteristics are provided by the state – hence the 
term public goods. 
Of course, knowledge is not costless to create. In the absence of the ability to 
appropriate any benefits arising from the creation of knowledge, few would incur the 
costs to create it. This would lead to suboptimal rates of knowledge creation for 
society. One solution is for governments to subsidise the creation of knowledge and 
make it freely available as a public good. Much basic research is provided in this way. 
The development of new knowledge is, however, risky because it is not possible to 
ensure that research expenditures will bring forth new knowledge. Governments have 
no particular advantage in being able to pick winners when allocating research funds 
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(Davies and Kerr, 1997). The private sector may be willing to share the risks 
associated with knowledge creation and may be more adept at picking winners. Thus, 
it has been long recognized in modern market economies that the private sector has a 
role in knowledge creation. To facilitate this role, however, it was necessary to alter 
the public-good characteristics of knowledge. This was done through the creation of 
artificial property rights for intellectual endeavours through government sanction and 
enforcement. These property rights take a number of forms – patents, copyrights, 
trademarks and so on – but have the common characteristic that they endow the owner 
of the property rights with a (temporary) monopoly. This is the source of much of the 
difficulty related to the TRIPS. 
There is an explicit trade-off inherent in the granting of intellectual property rights 
through monopoly. It is well known that monopolists restrict supply and charge a 
higher price than would be the case under competition. Thus, monopolies lead to the 
underprovision of goods or services derived from the creation of knowledge. This 
underprovision is temporary, determined by the period for which the monopoly is 
granted, and often carries with it other obligations (e.g., the requirement of full 
disclosure of the knowledge as part of the patenting process).
6 This underprovision is 
accepted as the cost of securing the creation of new knowledge and the increases in 
societal welfare that it brings (Gaisford et al., 2001). 
The sanctioning of monopolies also means, however, that there is no direct 
relationship between the cost of creating new knowledge and the returns that can be 
secured from the marketplace. Thus, it is possible that firms that create new 
knowledge may reap very high returns from the knowledge that they develop.
7 This 
may appear particularly true when costs are considered in relation to the development 
of an individual product. In reality, firms involved in knowledge creation must reap 
sufficient returns from their winners to offset the losses incurred in developing failures 
if they are to survive. Still, there is no direct relationship between total cost 
(production plus research and development) and total revenue. Large supernormal 
profits are possible. 
While the trade-off between knowledge creation and monopoly distortion has 
been accepted in most developed countries for a considerable period, this has not been 
true in developing countries. They have tended to focus on the high monopoly prices 
and monopoly profits reaped by foreign corporations. As developing countries 
produced so little intellectual property given their levels of education and dearth of 
research infrastructure and capacity, they saw few benefits.
8 As a result, they have 
been willing to free ride on the creation of knowledge in developed countries. They 
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had long-standing policies of choosing not to protect intellectual property in the pre-
TRIPS era. While firms in developed countries may have been frustrated by the 
absence of multinational protection of their intellectual property, their governments 
accepted the status quo. The question is, what caused the changes that culminated in 
the TRIPS being incorporated into the new WTO at the end of the Uruguay Round in 
1994? 
The proportion of the value of goods comprised of intellectual property has been 
rising at a rapid rate over the last few decades. This rise is largely the result of the 
widespread dissemination of computer technology
9 as well as the low-cost 
dissemination of information that is embodied in the internet and, latterly, the ability 
to use and commercialize genetic information; the foundations of what is loosely 
termed the knowledge economy. The governments of modern market economies have 
accepted the knowledge economy as the key to their future relative prosperity and 
have invested heavily in attempting to ensure that, individually, they will be among its 
leaders. 
Not only has the proportion of the value of goods comprised of intellectual 
property been rising rapidly, but the rate of knowledge creation has been increasing. 
This means that the life cycle of any advancement in knowledge is shortening. In turn, 
this means that to increase the probability of a positive return on investment in 
knowledge creation, firms making those investments need access to the widest 
possible markets, including international markets. Thus, they need the protection of 
their intellectual property extended to a larger set of countries. At the same time as the 
pressure to extend international protection of intellectual property arose, the technical 
capacity of some developing countries to engage in intellectual property piracy 
through practices such as reverse engineering increased, particularly in Asia (Yampoin 
and Kerr, 1998). The existing international arrangements for the international 
protection of intellectual property, primarily the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) and the conventions it administers, had no means of 
encouraging developing countries to participate and no mechanism to ensure that 
commitments were complied with. 
Seeing their relative economic prosperity being tied to being leaders in the 
knowledge economy, developed countries had no incentive to induce developing 
countries to protect intellectual property by providing the means by which they would 
benefit from it. In essence, they would be creating their own future rivals. This is an 
inherent contradiction in developed countries’ policy toward the protection of 
intellectual property. They protect intellectual property and accept the costs associated 
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with the artificial monopoly because they benefit from knowledge creation, not simply 
because society’s welfare increases in the short run but because their firms can create 
additional knowledge in the future. To foster those same benefits in developing 
countries through capacity building and the funding of the development of human 
capital and research infrastructure − basically to recreate the tried and true incentives 
that motivate protection of intellectual property in their own country − has not 
garnered much support because it is perceived as creating rivals in the knowledge 
creation race. An alternative to positive incentives was sought. 
The TRIPS Threat 
O 
ne alternative to positive incentives is a threat. Incorporating protection of 
intellectual property, which is not really a trade issue,
10 into the WTO during the 
Uruguay Round provided the coercive mechanism that was missing in the WIPO. The 
coercive mechanism is the imposition of trade sanctions for violations of TRIPS 
commitments.
11 The GATT 1947 was redesigned to facilitate the protection of 
intellectual property. While the form of the institutional architecture of the new WTO 
was not entirely based on facilitating the incorporation of the TRIPS,
12 it was a major 
influence. 
To make the TRIPS effective, developing countries had to be part of the 
agreement. In the new WTO, to be a member of the GATT and receive the benefits it 
provided for the trade in goods, one had to also accept TRIPS disciplines
13 – there 
could be no opting out. If a country did not want to accept the TRIPS it had to 
withdraw from the WTO. Each of the agreements (TRIPS, GATS and GATT) is 
administered by an individual council under the overall auspices of the WTO. The 
WTO also directly administers a unified dispute settlement system for all three 
agreements. The unified disputes system explicitly allows for cross-agreement 
retaliation. This means that when a country is found to be in violation of its TRIPS 
commitments, the country whose intellectual property has not been protected can 
impose trade restrictions under GATT on imports of goods from the country found to 
be in violation of its TRIPS commitments. This cross-agreement retaliation was 
necessary because tit for tat withdrawal of intellectual property protection under the 
TRIPS would not work in the case where the offending country did not produce any 
intellectual property. As the GATT was already mandated to impose trade sanctions, 
cross-agreement retaliation was an easier route to take than having trade sanctions 
imposed directly in the TRIPS.
14 
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Finally, a binding dispute mechanism was required. The GATT 1947 had a 
consensus-based dispute settlement system whereby all members, including the 
accused country, had to agree to the establishment of a panel and acceptance of a 
panel’s report. The WTO dispute system allows a single country to request a panel and 
the panel’s rulings are binding.
15 If the accused country chooses to ignore the panel’s 
ruling then the aggrieved country is allowed to seek compensation or, if that cannot be 
agreed, to retaliate. 
The TRIPS commitments are relatively straightforward. Countries agree to put 
domestic legislation in place that conforms to international conventions;
16 that gives 
equal protection to domestic and foreign holders of intellectual property; that is 
transparent; that allows for due process; and that is accessible to all (and foreign 
parties in particular). Countries also agree that resources will be committed to 
enforcement.
17 Developed countries had to comply within one year of the TRIPS 
coming into force and developing countries were given five years to comply, while 
least developed countries were given eleven years. For the most part, countries have 
put the appropriate legislation in place. The efficacy with which they are enforcing the 
legislation is not yet clear. 
The TRIPS/WTO system was designed to facilitate coercion. The coercive 
mechanism, however, remains almost untested as few cases have been brought to 
WTO panels. In part, this is because there was a moratorium on cases over the phase-
in period for developing and least developed countries.
18 This brings up the question 
of the credibility of the trade threat. The existing theoretical research suggests, over a 
wide range of assumptions, that the size of the trade penalty will not be sufficient to 
induce countries to enforce intellectual property rights (Gaisford et al., 2002; Yampoin 
and Kerr, 1998).
19 This is because the nullification of benefits to the economy from 
piracy plus the enforcement costs are larger than the costs imposed by trade 
retaliation.
20 When one factors in the probabilities that a failure to enforce will be 
detected, that a case will be mounted at the WTO, that a case will be won and that 
trade measures will be applied, the incentives to actively enforce TRIPS commitments 
appears small. 
Further, little is known about the cost of enforcement in developing countries 
(Yampoin and Kerr, 2002). One suspects that effective enforcement will require 
considerable resources. While some common forms of intellectual property piracy are 
relatively easy to detect – violation of copyright for film and music and trademarks in 
the form of fake watches and blue jeans – others relating to industrial processes, 
computer software, active ingredients in pharmaceuticals and gene sequencing – are 
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not. While the losses from copyright and trademark piracy can be substantial, it is 
piracy related to patents and reverse engineering of industrial processes that threaten 
the knowledge economy strategies of firms and developed-country governments. It 
can be difficult to identify a violation of these rights and to make the link to the 
person(s) involved. A highly trained and sophisticated policing system is required. An 
intelligent police force, however, is not sufficient for effectively combating 
intellectual property rights infringements. Modern technology and extensive training 
are key to controlling intellectual property rights infringements. These are not 
characteristics of police forces in developing countries.         
The police force is not the only arm of enforcement that must ensure intellectual 
property rights are protected. Investigators, lawyers and judges play an important role 
in convicting those who infringe on other’s intellectual property rights. Investigators 
may not be willing to devote sufficient time to collecting evidence for a case dealing 
with intellectual property rights. Other crimes seem more criminal and therefore the 
investigator may unknowingly devote more time to those cases. As with the police 
force, investigators are also likely to be inexperienced in the area of intellectual 
property and lack training in the methodologies used to investigate such cases.  
Inexperience is not just limited to the police that carry out the preliminary aspects 
of enforcement and the investigators who collect evidence when an infringement 
occurs.  Lawyers and judges in the legal system will also require training, and a pool 
of independent experts to draw information from is required when dealing with 
intellectual property rights cases.   
If costs of enforcement are high, governments in developing countries are likely 
to want to use their scarce resources elsewhere. It is hard to see why protecting the 
intellectual property of foreigners would be a high priority for developing-country 
governments, particularly if the costs associated with the imposition of trade barriers 
are not a significant deterrent. Their existing capacity would not allow for effective 
enforcement and they have little incentive to make the necessary investments in 
capacity building. The Office of the United States Trade Representative recently 
indicated that it had concerns relating to intellectual property protection and 
enforcement in forty-five developing countries.  
Indirect Incentives 
T 
o get the developing countries to agree to the TRIPS during the Uruguay Round, 
developed countries provided indirect incentives – that is, incentives not directly 
arising from the protection of intellectual property. They offered developing countries 
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concessions in the areas of improved access to developed-country markets for 
agricultural goods and textiles, among others. Thus, developing countries did not buy 
into the TRIPS, they were induced into reluctantly accepting it through the provision 
of indirect incentives. Having agreed to the new WTO institutional architecture, 
including the TRIPS, the developing countries found that the incentives they had been 
promised were largely illusionary. Through a combination of dirty tariffication, tariff-
rate quota establishment and non-tariff barriers, developed countries have been able to 
continue to deny market access to agricultural products from developing countries 
(Meilke, 2000), while general foot dragging combined with the strategic use of 
contingency protection measures is taking place in textiles. Hence, the row over 
implementation that arose at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle was directly 
related to the TRIPS. 
Given that developing countries have no direct stake in the TRIPS, that the threat 
of trade sanctions appears weak, and that they did not receive the promised indirect 
benefits that were offered as incentives, it is probably not surprising that they are 
attempting to reduce the efficacy of the TRIPS even further. The difficult negotiations 
over pharmaceuticals are the thin edge of the wedge. Now that concessions have been 
gained for negotiations on pharmaceuticals on legitimate humanitarian grounds, the 
arguments centre on which countries should be able to avail themselves of the waiver 
(or whatever institutional arrangement eventually emerges to facilitate the inclusion of 
the exemption in the WTO) and to what public health issues it should apply. 
Developed countries want the waiver to apply only to a subset of developing countries 
and a narrow list of diseases. Developing countries are arguing that they all should 
have the right to avail themselves of the waiver and to determine to what public health 
issues it should apply. Further concessions have already been made so that least 
developed countries are exempt from protecting intellectual property rights in 
pharmaceutical products until 2016. Similar contests will be waged over 
biotechnology and the protection of traditional knowledge and folklore. 
The TRIPS made no concessions to developing countries except that there were to 
be longer phase-in periods. This relative lack of concessions is an anomaly in the 
WTO. Special and differential treatment is accepted in the GATT. It has never been 
required that tariffs be harmonized. Tariff reductions have been partially phased in 
over fifty years. This has allowed the costs of adjustment to be spread over decades 
and politically sensitive sectors to remain protected. In the TRIPS, intellectual 
property protection had to be harmonized with high, developed-country standards in 
one step. This meant that all of the adjustment costs were borne by the developing 
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countries; developed countries had to make almost no changes. Gaisford and 
Richardson (2000) suggest that this symmetry in TRIPS commitments means that: 
South (developing countries) loses between 40 and 47 percent of the net 
benefits from patent protection that it received prior to the TRIPS 
agreement, while North (developed countries) gains (p. 142). 
Hence, the TRIPS provided perverse incentives in relation even to the small direct 




he TRIPS has become a major stumbling block at the Doha WTO negotiations. It 
would appear that developing countries have little interest in the TRIPS because 
they have no direct incentive to comply and the threat does not appear sufficient to 
induce compliance. Indirect incentives such as trade concessions in other areas, while 
sufficient to obtain the cooperation of developing countries in the establishment of the 
TRIPS, were not forthcoming in practice. One suspects that indirect incentives will 
always be more vulnerable to dilution than direct incentives. Further, direct incentives 
create a vested interest in enforcement while indirect incentives do not. Thus, it would 
seem that those countries that see their futures as being dependent on the ability to 
take advantage of the opportunities provided by the knowledge economy may need to 
rethink their approach to securing international protection for intellectual property. 
There are already signs that technology is moving forward at a pace that will 
require a revision to the TRIPS. Such a revision will be very difficult to obtain given 
the current attitude of developing countries. There is as yet little indication that 
developed countries are willing to change their strategy of offering indirect incentives. 
For example:  
In negotiations for a free trade agreement with Chile completed this week, 
the U.S. succeeded in obtaining protections for patents and copyrights that 
go beyond the provisions of the World Trade Organization Agreement on 
Aspects of Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (sic). 
Chile held out until the final hours of negotiations on the night of Dec. 11 
on the U.S. push to include protection for copyrights for digitally delivered 
products, using it as a bargaining chit to achieve more access for its 
agricultural products (Inside US Trade, December 13, 2002). 
or: 
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The European Union’s success in pushing for strong protection for 
geographic indications of wines and spirits through the creation of an 
international registry is likely to be linked to the ability of the EU and 
other World Trade Organization members to make substantive trade 
liberalization proposals in the area of agriculture in the new WTO round, a 
senior WTO official said last week (Inside US Trade, November 1, 2002). 
One suspects that these initiatives, even if they are successful in obtaining the 
concessions desired by those with a vested interest in the knowledge economy, will not 
see sufficient effort on enforcement over the long run. At some point the efficacy of 
the trade threat will have to be tested. 
The solution to the problem of providing direct incentives to protect intellectual 
property will not be easy to solve. However, it would seem that the resources of 
developed countries would be better spent on capacity building in the creation of 
intellectual property than on capacity building for the enforcement of the property 
rights of foreign nationals. As in developed countries, once a direct stake is created in 
the protection of intellectual property, enforcement in developing countries will 
naturally follow. 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy  11   W.A. Kerr 
References 
Davies, A.S. and W.A. Kerr (1997) Picking Winners: Agricultural Research and the 
Allocation of Public Funds. The Review of Policy Issues 3 (3): 39-50. 
EU Push for Wine, Spirit Protection Linked to Strides on Agriculture. Inside US 
Trade November 1, 2002. 
Gaisford, J.D., J.E. Hobbs, W.A. Kerr, N. Perdikis and M.D. Plunkett (2001) The 
Economics of Biotechnology. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Press. 
Gaisford, J.D and W.A. Kerr (2002) Biotechnology Issues in Western Hemisphere 




Gaisford, J.D. and R.S. Richardson (2000) The TRIPS Disagreement: Should GATT 
Traditions Have Been Abandoned? The Estey Centre Journal of International 
Law and Trade Policy 1 (2) :137-170.  
Gaisford, J.D., R. Tarvydas, J.E. Hobbs and W.A. Kerr (2002) Biotechnology Piracy: 
Rethinking the International Protection of Intellectual Property. Canadian Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 50 (1): 1-14. 
Gordon, D.V., R. Hannesson and W.A. Kerr (2001) Of Fish and Whales: The 
Credibility of Threats in International Trade Disputes. Journal of Policy Modeling 
23 (1): 83-98. 
Isaac, G. E. and W.A. Kerr (2002) International Trade, Intellectual Property Rights 
and Indigenous Knowledge: The Case of Plant Genetic Resources. Conference 
paper for Indigenous Peoples and Multilateral Trade Regimes: Navigating New 
Opportunities for Advocacy, New York University Law School. New York, May 
2002. 
Kerr, W.A. (2001) The World Trade Organization and the Environment. In H.J. 
Michelman, J. Rude, J. Stabler and G. Storey (eds.) Globalization and 
Agricultural Trade Policy. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 53-65. 
Kerr, W.A. and R. Yampoin (2000) Adoption of Biotechnology in Thailand and the 
Threat of Intellectual Property Piracy. Canadian Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 48 (4): 597-66. 
Meilke, K.D. (2000) What Went Wrong at Seattle? CATRN Paper 2000-01, Canadian 
Agri-food Trade Research Network, http://www.eru.ulaval.ca/catrn/whathap.pdf. 
U.S. Gets TRIPS-Plus Copyright, Patent Protection in Chile Deal. Inside US Trade 
December 13, 2002, 
http://www.insidetrade.com/secure/dsply_nl_txt.asp?f=wto2001.ask&dh=108746
209&q= 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy  12   W.A. Kerr 
World Trade Organization (2002) Annual Report (2002) of the Council for TRIPS, 
IP/C/27, (02-6790), Geneva, December 6. 
Yampoin, R. and W.A. Kerr (1998) Can Trade Measures Induce Compliance with 
TRIPS? Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 3 (2): 165-182. 
 
Endnotes 
                                                       
1.  Concluding Remarks by the Chairman, Trade Negotiations Committee Meeting, 
WTO Geneva, December 4-6, 2002, 
http://www.insidetrade.com/secure/pdf3/wto2002_7744.pdf 
2.  Statement issued to mark World AIDS Day (December 1, 2002), Lamy Says New 
TRIPS Deal Must Include Re-Export Safeguard, IP/02/1778, European 
Commission, Brussels, November 29, 2002. 
3.  Senate Letter on TRIPS sent to The Honorable Robert Zoellick, United States 
Trade Representative, on December 9, 2002, 
http://www.insidetrade.com/secure/dsply_nl_txt.asp?f=wto2001.ask&dh=108719
329&q=. 
4.  USTR Letter to African Trade Ministers, October 25, 2002, 
http://www.insidetrade.com/secure/dsply_nl_txt.asp?f=wto2001.ask&dh=105327
674&q=  
5.  This issue is also contentious among developed countries. 
6.  This is to enhance the creation of additional knowledge by allowing other 
researchers access.  
7.  Of course, it is also possible that monopolies will lose money. There are many 
inventions that fail in the marketplace and represent the downside risk associated 
with investing in the creation of knowledge. 
8.  Of course, by not protecting intellectual property, they ensured that little capacity 
for knowledge creation would develop. 
9.  Not simply the use of desktop personal computers but the widespread use of 
computer technology in industry (e.g., robots) and consumer goods (e.g., as 
integral parts of modern automobiles).  
10.  Trade in counterfeit goods was already dealt with in the GATT. 
11.  The GATT 1947 was an organization that dealt with rules of trade. It was, 
however, somewhat unique in that it was one of the few international 
organizations that had a mandate to impose trade sanctions – the Security Council 
of the United Nations being another. Given that trade sanctions are one of the few 
means available to influence the behaviour of foreign governments, along with 
diplomacy and war, the GATT was a likely target for capture by vested interests.  
If the GATT/WTO can be captured by one set of vested interests, those wishing 
international protection for intellectual property, it may be open for capture by 
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other vested interests. See Kerr (2001) for a discussion of this in the context of 
environmental interests. 
12.  The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) also needed an institutional 
home and the consensus-based GATT 1947 dispute settlement system needed to 
be strengthened to better deal with disputes in the trade in goods. 
13.  Of course, countries also had to accept GATS disciplines as well. 
14.  Governments appear to be very reticent to extend the ability to impose trade 
sanctions to other international organizations in any meaningful way. The United 
Nations Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and multilateral 
environmental agreements are obvious examples. 
15.  One level of appeal is provided for. 
16.  Either those administered by the WIPO or in a few cases those directly embodied 
in the TRIPS. 
17.  The resource commitment clause is, however, vague and may be a focus point for 
future disputes. 
18.  It may also be that a threat may be more effective while it remains untested – see 
Gordon et al. (2001) on the efficacy of trade threats.  
19.  Of course, the goods upon which trade restrictions are placed are chosen by the 
country retaliating. As a result, it may be possible to select products for retaliation 
that are politically more sensitive than their economic value indicates. 
20.  The WTO has not yet settled upon a method for determining retaliation in TRIPS 
cases but if the GATT precedent is followed the penalty should be equal in value 
to the cost. It is hard to imagine that WTO members would agree that the penalty 
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